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The paper develops  a formal model of government's economic decisions
as  influenced by private agents within the context of neoclassical
political economy.  The government is  assumed to  form preferences  over
interest groups  in the economy;  in turn these preferences are  influenced
by the rent seeking behavior of these groups.  An open, two-household,
two-sector general equilibrium model is  constructed to  depict an
environment  in which preference-maximizing  (rational) individuals allocate
otherwise productive  labor to  directly unproductive rent seeking
activities in order to  exert political pressure on the government's choice
of policy instruments.  With the aid of five comparative-static
experiments,  the game-theoretic component and the second-best nature of
the rent seeking environment is  discussed.  Insights are also provided on
the influence  of technological change, and changes  in lobbying efficiency
on resources  allocated to  rent seeking by interest groups.  Key words:
Rent  Seeking, Political Economy, General Equilibrium.AN OPEN ECONOMY MODEL OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE
AND COMPETITION AMONG RENT SEEKING GROUPS
Terry Roe and Erinc Yeldan
I. Introduction
Under  conditions  that preclude market failure and allow for the
possibility of lump sum income transfers, Buchanan (1980, p. 14) summarizes
the public choice view of this  role:  "As long as  governmental action is
restricted largely, if not entirely, to protection of individual rights,
person and property and enforcing voluntarily negotiated private contracts,
the market process dominates economic behavior and ensures  that any economic
rents  that appear will be dissipated by the force of competitive entry."
Unfortunately, lump sum income transfers are seldom feasible and the
conditions that  give rise to market failure  (externalities, public goods,
risk and information asymmetries) are common.  Whenever these conditions
prevail collective action can give rise to  an increase in welfare.  However,
recent studies of country adjustments to world economic shocks  (e.g.,
Balassa, 1982,  1986,  among others) provide strong empirical evidence  that
government interventions have been inimical to the growth process  in many
countries.
This  experience raises  several questions.  Why have some  countries
persisted in their pursuit of  interventions that exacerbated adjustments to
external  shocks and were wasteful of resources?  Are these  interventions
intended for the overall benefit of  their respective economies but, in
reality, a  sequence of policy mistakes?  Or,  are interventions  the outcome
of political pressure exerted by domestic  interest groups seeking to achieve
outcomes which might be favorable  to  them but are, nevertheless,  socially
wasteful of resources?  If the  former were the case, why have countries
failed to  learn from these mistakes?Lucas  (1986),  and others  (Romer 1986,  Prescott and Boyd 1987),have
recently investigated the possibility that the level and rates of the
disparate growth in per capita income among the world's economies lies  in
how society, acting collectively, addresses problems of market failure
attributed to externalities and public goods.  In this context,  is  it
possible  that efforts of individuals or groups  to  seek their differential
advantage lead to government interventions  that distort market signals,
induce an inefficient allocation of resources  in the private sector, as well
as underinvestment and inadequate controls  in areas where markets otherwise
function poorly  to optimally allocate society's  resources?  Moreover, if
intervention is  pervasive, it is not surprising to  find (as is shown in the
simple model developed in this paper) that our ability to understand private
sector choices  is  limited because these choices  are interdependent with the
policy rules of government and with the choices  of other groups  in society
that are also  seeking their differential advantage?
We omit a discussion of the nature and apparent motivation of
government intervention that has been observed to  occur in numerous
countries  . Instead, a brief overview of selected "informal"  theories  of
government behavior is presented.  This review serves to motivate  the
development of a model of rent seeking households with endogenous government
behavior.  Some implications  of the model conclude the paper.
II.  Overview Of Informal Theories  Of Government Intervention
Insights  into the motivation for government intervention are provided
For a review of some of this literature, see Terry Roe and Mathew
Shane  (1986),  "Government in the Process of Trade and Development,"  paper
presented at  the meetings of The International Agricultural Trade Research
Consortium, CIMMYT in Mexico, December 15,  1986.in a growing body of literature that Colander (1984) termed neo-classical
political economy.  The key strands of this  literature  are distinguished by
the more  "informal"  theories of the political science  school typified most
recently by Bates  (1983),  on the behavior of governments  in East Africa, and
by Mancur Olson  (1982),  on distributional coalitions and the free rider
problem.  "Formal" theories have evolved from the public choice school
(e.g.,  Buchanan and Tullock 1980),  and the  field of trade and development
where emphasis  is placed on rent seeking  (Krueger 1974) or, as Bhagwati
(1982) has suggested, on directly unproductive profit seeking (DUP)
activities.  The various approaches have involved tariffs versus  quotas as
rent seeking instruments, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980),  rent seeking and
rent avoidance, Appelbaum and Katz  (1986) and, more recently, an approach
which permits the regulators  of instruments to  induce rent seeking,
Appelbaum and Katz  (1987).
Our approach bears a resemblence to  the problem considered by Appelbaum
and Katz  (1987),  but we adapt the  framework developed by Becker  (1983) and
cast our problem in an economy-wide general equilibrium context.  While the
model is  simple,  it  illustrates many of  the  issues  identified in the
informal  theories.
Bates  (p. 169) views public policy as  "the  outcome of political
pressures exerted by members of the domestic  economy seeking their own
interests".  In the case of developing countries, he argues that urban
consumers are potent pressure groups demanding low priced food.  They have
political  influence because of their geographical concentration and
strategic location.  They can quickly organize and they are largely employed
in providing public services so they can, with relative  ease, impose
deprivation on others.  Bates notes that urban unrest forms a significant
prelude to changes  of governments  in Africa.Interests of urban consumers coincide with those of domestic
industrialists who view low priced food as  serving to  decrease the pressure
on wages.  The  industrialists also are effective in obtaining protection
from imports because of the notion that the key to development lies in
industrialization.  Furthermore, since  industrial goods account for a small
share of most households' budgets  in LDC's,  import protection  of industrial
goods will not have a large direct impact on expenditures of most
households.  The outcomes are policies which tend to support both import
substitution and low cost food to urban households.
The same argument applies to developed economies.  In advanced stages
of development, the food share of  the consumer's budget declines  so that
consumers become  less sensitive  to  increases in food prices.  Agriculture
becomes a smaller component in the total economy and farmers tend to be more
specialized.  Within their area of specialization, they are better able to
organize than are urban groups.  Moreover, with food a small share of
consumer's expenditures, protection demands  in agriculture can be met at
lower political cost, with the result that the agricultural sector receives
2
protection relative to the  industrial sector2
While  these arguments provide insights into the motivation for
interventions, why do governments prefer to intervene  in markets which
perform relatively well if left alone when they could accomplish the same
objectives in areas where markets function poorly?  Bates argues  that market
interventions facilitate the allocation of political rents.  Market
interventions permit governments to target the allocation of subsidies
2Hayami and Honma  (1985) and Anderson (1983,  1985) provide some
empirical support for  this general view and extend it  to explain why policy
regimes  in developed countries  tend to protect agriculture and regimes in
developing countries  tend to  tax agriculture.through control of marketing functions while, at  the same time,  transferring
resources to  supporters  (civil servants) engaged in carrying out  these
interventions.  In Bates's terminology, market interventions  facilitate the
"organization of the rural constituency" who support the government and to
"disorganize the rural opposition".
Similar to Bates, Olson focuses attention on the  formation of special
interest  groups into coalitions  and their role in obtaining a differential
advantage through lobbying activities.  Important among the inferences he
draws are  that  (a) broad based coalitions  tend to  take  into account the
adverse macroeconomic effects of their lobbying efforts so  that the adverse
effects of the differential advantage  they seek tends  to  be less than those
of narrow-based coalitions, and  (b)  narrow based coalitions  tend to be more
interested in the distribution of society's income to  members of the
coalition since resources  to expand societies output have  to be shared with
the rest of society while  the benefits of the  same resources  spent on
3
redistributing society's output in its  favor accrue entirely to  the group  .
Next, we develop a simplified model of endogenous government behavior
with rent seeking households.  The literature on DUP or rent seeking
4
activities offers  a point of departure  for our approach  . While  abstract
and necessarily narrow in  illustrating certain aspects that might motivate
intervention, the model nevertheless captures  some of the  insights provided
3
See Olson, Chapter 9, p.  203-205.  Pryor (1983,1984) attempted to
obtain empirical support for theoverall implication of Olson's theory,
namely that economies characterized by broad based coalitions should out
perform economies characterized by narrow based coalitions.  Pryor (p.  174)
concludes  that  "  ... Olson's theory is  formulated in a manner still too
general  to prove successful  in the empirical tests..."
4An earlier review of this literature can be found in Bhagwati.  A more
recent review and some  extensions also appear in Colander.
5by the informal  theories as well as  some of the questions raised in  the
introduction  to  this  paper.
III. A Model Of Rent Seeking With Endogenous Government Behavior
Consider the case of a two-good, two-household rural-urban economy that
cannot affect its external terms of trade.  The government in this economy
is  assumed to announce prices (P ,Pn) of the rural and urban goods
respectively and then to engage in domestic and foreign tradeuntil markets
5
clear  . Households are permitted to allocate a portion of their labor
endowments to directly unproductive profit seeking activities, through
lobbying, in order to influence  the government's pricing decision in their
favor.
Households' choices  are defined by:




(1 )  X  =  -[((q  ,q  ,L1ii)  R+  IYi   Paq  ai  +  Pnqni i  ai  ni  ->  i  a  +a.  n  'n
L.  >  L  - 1  and X i  0),
1  3  31  i  i
where the  index i, j  - a  (rural), n  (urban) denotes households;  V.(.)
is  the household's direct utility function of the  standard neo-classical
type;  qai  and qni  are quantities of the rural and urban good consumed by the
i-th household;  L. is  the household's total labor endowment that  is 1
In the context of this model, the domestic-world price relationship is
w
P. - (1 +  t.)P. where t.  is  the tax or tariff rate.  Hence, the choice of P.
p1  1  1  1  -t
implies  t.  - (P.  - P  )/P  . It  is  easily  shown  that  the  results  obtained 1  1  a  iaia
from the model are  invariant to the choice of P. or  t. as instruments.
6
6allocated to production activities in sectors j - a,n, and to  lobbying or
rent seeking activities  (.l).  Hence, L.  denotes the quantity of labor from 1  ja
the rural household's endowment that is  allocated to production activities
in the j-th sector.  Y. denotes  the household income derived from production
3.
and wages. -Assuming full employment,
(2)  Y  - P.Qi(L.)  - WL. +  W(L  - 1),
1  11  1  1  1  1
where L. is  the amount of labor employed in the production of Qi at wage
2  2 rate W;  8Q./aL. > 0 and a  Q./aL. < 0 is  assumed.
A more general  specification would consider a vector of inputs and
expenditures, but this would unnecessarily complicate  the model for purposes
here.  As Bhagwati (1982) has shown, the reallocation of inputs from
production to  lobbying and other activities which do not produce a good or
service  that yields utility may provide pecuniary returns  to  individual
households, but  it can be socially wasteful of resources.  If the choice of
1  succeeds  in inducing the government to  increase P  relative to P ,  then n  n  a
urban households can be made better off than  the rural households  that
produce the rural  good Qa.  Hence,  in principle, a strategic interdependence
exists between these households.
A.  Household's view of political economy
Before households  can choose  i.,  they must  form a hypothesis of the
effect of lobbying on the government's choice of  levels for the  instruments
P  and P . In an attempt to  formulate a formal expression for this a  n
"influence", we utilize Becker's  (1983) concept of the  "pressure function".
Becker defines a function that relates inputs,  including  the number of
members in the coalition, to  the production of pressure.  This  specification
accounts for  the free rider problem of the  large diverse coalitions
discussed by Olson.We omit the free rider component since there are only two households.
We assume that households allocate labor to the production of political
pressure  in order to exert influence on politicians at the national  level
according to the following simple function:
(3)  w.  - w(1;Z.), i  - a,  n.
2  2
where  a•./al. > 0 and a8 /8al  < 0.  The exogenous variable Z. summarizes the
3  3  1  3.
state  of the political economy that affects  the efficiency of converting
lobbying into pressure (i.).
Pressure is  assumed to  influence the government's formation of
preferences over households in the economy.  We express the government's
preferences  in  the  following  simple  form:
(4)  U  - IV  +  IV  +IfV(R) aa  nn  ff
where V  and V  are  the utility of rural and urban households defined above a  n
and, for our purposes here, Vf is  the utility of an aggregate of next period
households.  The usefulness of this construction is discussed below.
The I. are influence  functions which define the government's preference
ordering;  they map the pressure from lobbying into influence6 . These
functions  are:
(5)  I  - I(la  ,n  Z  ,Z ,Z )  - I.(Wa  ,w  Z  ), w  ti  i  a  n  a  n  o  i  a'  o
where  the exogenous variable Z  summarizes the state of the political
6
A more general formulation is U(Va,V ;I1)  + U(Vf(R;1
2 )).  However this
complicates the specification of the properties of the influence  functions
I..  Also, we recognize the possibility  that the policy decision making
3
process is  likely to be polyarchial  (as opposed to hieracrchial) with some
units of government being more strongly influenced by some coalitions than
others.  Then,-  a  single objective function will not capture the essence of
political behavior.  Instead, each decision making unit of government may
too seek pecuniary gains subject  to  legal constraints.
8economy that converts pressure  into influence. They have the property:
I  + I  + I  - 1, 0 < I < 1.
a  n  f
where If is predetermined.  To  guarantee that the  set X.is convex, we
require  that I. be strictly concave in 1..
The conversion of pressure into influence by rural households is  not
independent of the conversion of pressure into influence by urban
households.  That is,  the political influence functions are not independent
because  influence of the urban household that raises the relative price of
the urban good, imposes an implicit indirect tax on the rural household
through  their consumption expenditures  on Qn and it affects  incomes through
the  labor  market.
Thus, we require
(6)  -aia/a8i.- a In/a•
As Becker (1983, p.376) points out, since
(7)  a2 n/a8  8a  -2  a2 n/aa  n n  n  a n  a  n
an interdependence can exist between the households' marginal products of
lobbying.  If an increase  in  a raises  the marginal product of  n  ,
(a21  /af naa  >  0),  then an increase in wn would lower the absolute value of n  n  a  n
the marginal effect of  a on I . Moreover, an increase in other exogenous
a  n
variables  that raise the  influence of the i-th group, will lower  the
influence of the other group.
The budgetary consequence of the  government's choices  is  given by:
(8)  R - (1-P )(Q  - .iqni .)  +  (P-1)(. i q a .-Q  ),
where world prices are assumed to be equal to unity.  If  the government
chooses unit domestic prices,  then R  is  zero and markets clear throughforeign trade.  A choice of prices P  and P  that subsidize current period
a  n
households (R negative)  is simply treated as a lump sum claim on, or an
income transfer, to  next period households.  Note also  that current period
households do not lobby for purpose of augmenting income from direct
government budget transfers.  Hence, this particular construction only
permits the government's choices  of P  and P  to effect current period a  n
markets.
The decision rules  for determining the instruments P  and P  can, in a  n
principle, be obtained by assuming that the government chooses  the level of
its  instruments as  though it sought  to maximize the objective function.
Domestic prices then can be expressed in terms of the  following pricing
rules:
(9)  P  - P (1 ,l ;Z  ) a  a  an
(10)  P  - P (1  ,l  ;Z  ), n  n  a  n
where
*  *  w  w
Z  - (If,LaL ,Z ,Z  Z ,P ,P ), f a  n  a  n  o  a  n
w  w
is  a vector of exogenous variables  including world prices, P  and P ,  of a  n
rural and urban goods respectively.  It is  shown in the appendix that,
essentially, if the government's preference weights are equal across
households, domestic prices  are equated to world prices.  Hence, by
construction,  the model does not restrict a free trade outcome.
B.  The interdependence and game component of the problem
Assuming that households correctly perceive the objective of
government, equation (4);  know the political process through the influence
functions  (5);  and the technology reflected in the pressure functions  (3);
equations (9)  and (10) can be substituted into the households' budget
constraint  (1):
10(1')  P(a,1  ;Z  )Q.(Li)  +  W(lal  ;Z  )(Li  - L.-  1.)  -
P  (1 ,1  ;Z  )q  . +  P  (1 ,1  ;Z  )qni a  a  n  at  n  a  n  ni
where,  assuming  full  employment,  the  labor  wage  rate  W(la,1n;Z  )  is  given  by
the market clearing condition:
Z.L.- Z.(L. - 1.).
Notice that the wage rate  is  directly influenced by lobbying which decreases
the  amount  of  labor  available  for  production.  Hence,  we  obtain  the  familiar
result of other rent seeking models, namely, as  resources are withdrawn from
production and allocated to  rent seeking activities, production
possibilities  are  reduced.
It  is  easily  shown  that,  conditional  on  the  j-th household's  lobbying
activities,  the  i-th household  allocates  time  to  lobbying  activities  to  the
point  where  marginal  gains  from  lobbying  are  equal  to  the  wage  rate  and  to
the marginal value product of production:
(11)  (8P./81.)Q(L.) +  (8w/aPi)(aP./ai )[L  L. - .]
-(P  /81.l)qi'  -(P  /81.)q  -W(la  ln;Z  )-P8aQ(L.)/aL.. a  1  ai  n  1  ni  a  n  1  1  1
In  order  for  the  household  to  determine  any  of  its  choice  variables,  it
needs  to  either  know  or  assume  the  other  household's  level  of  lobbying
7
activity  (1.).  This  is  the  interdependence  nature  of  the  problem  . From
the  implicit  function  theorem,  the  i-th  household's  choice  can  be  expressed
as:
7  *
Household utility can be expressed as:  V. - V.(1  ,1 ,Z )r 1  1  a  n
11qai  Fai.(1;Z  )  - qi(Pa P ,Y i)
qni - Fni(1j;Z  )  - qni(Pa  ,P ,Y)
L. - F (1j;Z  )  - L(P.,W)
1. - P.i(lj;Z  )  - 1.i(P  ,aP  Yn) , i  )  j - a, n.
1  3-  3-  a  n'  i  '  J  - a, n.
These results suggest that  in economies where intervention is
extensive, identification of the households decision rules may well need to
take into account the manner in which households  influence policy decisions.
Efforts  to  estimate the parameters of the RHS functions when P. are  treated
1
as  exogenous will likely not identify the true parameters since  the P. are
1
jointly determined with the  1..  Further complications may arise because the
parameters of these functions  are likely to change  as households learn of
the other's reaction function.
IV. A Numerical Illustration
Next, we provide a numerical illustration of the general equilibrium
interactions  involved in an economy engaged in rent seeking.  We  assumed the
following initial conditions:  L  - 6.0;  L  - 5.5;  I  - 0.33  (and hence, a  n  '  f
current households compete  for the remaining 0.667 units of government
influence, equation 4).  World prices were set to unity.
The functional forms selected for the households' utility and
production functions  are Cobb-Douglas.  Hence, the  indirect utility function
for the i-th household is of the form:
V. - a~  (P)  (P)  (Hi.+  W(L. - 1.)) 1  1  i  1
where II.  is  the  indirect profit function associated with production 1
activities of the  i-th household and a  and  3 are coefficients of  the direct
utility function.
The functional forms chosen to satisfy the properties of the  influence
12functions  (5) are:
(5')  In - C - C/(exp(n/la  )),  Ia- C/(exp(ln/1a))
where the constant C - 1 - If.
It can be observed from inspection of the first derivates of the
influence  functions with respect to i  that the urban households have a
"political advantage" in lobbying over  the rural household, i.e.,  the
marginal product of urban household lobbying is  greater than the marginal
product of rural household lobbying.  This  asymetric treatment was used to
illustrate the differential advantage that one group may have (because of
proximity to  cities, bureaucracy etc.)  over another interest group.
A.  Effect  of  the  lobbying  activity
A solution to  our hypothetical economy without rent seeking activities
appears  in the first column of Table  1.  Influence weights were assigned
evenly between the  two households, each at 0.333.  Domestic prices of unity
clear markets and trade  is  in equilibrium in real terms.  Parameters were
chosen so  that rural households would be deficit producers of rural goods;
this will simplify latter exposition of rent seeking activity.  The economy
exports urban goods to  meet the consumption needs  of rural goods  for both
rural and urban households.
Column two of the  table reports  the results when the lobbying structure
presented above was added to  the model.  The optimal solution to  the model
results  in a urban household lobbying level of 0.434 units of labor.  From
equation  (11),  the real wage of 0.441  is the opportunity cost of the  last
unit of labor allocated to lobbying activity.  Lobbying yields the
government's influence weight I  of 0.658 for urban households and a
corresponding decrease in the rural household's  influence weight, Ia,  to
0.009.  By construction, the rural household  is a deficit producer of rural
goods.  Hence,  it will not lobby for higher rural good prices since, as
13equation  (11) indicates,  to do so would increase the cost of consumption
relative to gains  in income.  To prevent division by zero  in equation (5'),
a lower bound of 0.1 was placed on the amount of labor that  the rural
household could allocate to lobbying activity.  Alternatively,  this
formulation can be interpreted from the point of view of the urban
household, i.e.,  as though the urban household is examining the implications
to its choices of an exogenously given lobbying activity of the rural
household.
Given these preference weights, the government sets the relative prices
of P  to P  at 2.248.  Consequently, the production of urban goods  increased
n  a
from 5.426  to 6.283 units while the production of rural goods declined from
3.052 units to 1.572 units.  In world prices, the value of aggregate
production decreased by 0.623.  The  real wage rate  increased from 0.369  to
0.411 due  to the withdrawal  of productive labor  to  lobbying and an increase
in the value marginal product associated with an increase in the relative
price of the urban good.  Employment in the urban sector increased and in
the rural sector it decreased.
Consumption of urban goods decreased  (from 4.239  to 3.491 units)  and
rural goods  increased (from 4.239  to 7.85 units).  For markets to  clear at
announced prices, exports and imports of urban and rural goods  increased
which resulted in a nominal government budget deficit of 3.486.  In the
context of this model, the deficit is a claim on the income of next period's
households.
The nominal  income of both rural and urban households  increased.  The
nominal increase  in rural household's  income results from increased wages
associated with the increase  in relative prices.  Of course,  the total  labor
employed in the productive sectors of the economy has declined by the amount
of labor allocated to lobbying  (0.534 units).  Despite the higher nominal
income of rural households, they were made worse off in real terms,






































Solutions were obtained using GAMS  (General Algebraic Modeling System),  a


























6.278suffering a decline in utility from 1.869 utils to 1.670 utils.  The utility
of next period households declined substantially, since the revenues  from
8
trade  (-3.486)  is a claim on the  income of future period housholds  . Hence,
the result of the  induced lobbying activity of urban households was for  the
government to tax rural and future period households.
B.  Comparative static experiments
Five experiments were performed to highlight the comparative static.
implications of the model.  Table 2 summarizes the qualitative results where
comparisons are made relative to  the solutions reported in column two of
Table  19 .
1. Increase rural household lobbying.  In this experiment, the  lower
bound on the endogenous variable 1,  rural household lobbying, was increased
from 0.1 to  0.2 units of labor and the model was resolved (column 1, table
2).  We first observe that the result predicted by equation (7) occurs,
namely, increased lobbying activities of the rural household increased the
marginal product of lobbying of the urban household, evaluated at previous
lobbying levels.  Consequently, the urban household was induced to  increase
its  lobbying activity.  The net result was to  increase the influence  of the
rural household (Ia) relative  to  the influence  (In) of the urban household
in spite of the increased lobbying efforts of the urban household.  Clearly,
the influence of the urban household would have declined even further had it
not attempted to counterveil the  lobbying efforts of rural household.  This
key result is  consistent with the observation of others (see  for example,
8
That is,  the economy is permitted a  trade deficit which future
households are obliged to repay.
9
Since the results reported in column two of table 1 are  for a
distorted economy, second best implications can be drawn from a comparison
of the experiments with the undistorted solution  (column 1, table  1).
16Srinivasan, 1985,  p.57)  that efforts  to  seek differential advantage  induces
other coalitions to  do likewise  and, therefore, to  further increase the
likelihood of decreasing the production possibilities available to the
economy.
The increased influence of the rural relative  to urban household
induced the government to  increase the price of the rural  relative  to the
urban good.  Thus,  employment and production in the rural sector increased
while employment and production in the urban sector decreased.  With more
labor allocated to  lobbying activities, less labor was allocated to
production activities with the net result that the real wage rate  increased
relative to that reported for the base solution in column two of Table 1.
Foreign trade declined and the nominal  income of rural  and urban households
also  declined because  the gain in revenues  from increased agricultural
activity was not sufficient to  overcome the change  in relative prices and
the  loss of wage  income received by the rural household.
2. Increase in the influence .LI.  of future households.  In this
experiment, If was  increased to 0.38, otherwise, all other parameters
remained at levels consistent with the base solution reported in column 2,
Table 1.  An increase in If  decreases the value of the parameter C in
2
equation  (5').  Since a  In/lna8C is  positive, a decrease in C decreases  the
marginal effect of 1  on I ;  essentially, increasing If reduces the
n  n'
"marginal effect"  (or efficiency) of a given increase in urban lobbying on
the  price  of  the  industrial  good,  Pn
There are  two key results.  First, the decline  in the efficiency-of
urban lobbying to influence the price of the industrial good induced urban
households  to decrease the amount of labor they allocated to  lobbying
activity.  Consequently, the  influence of the rural household increased
relative to the influence of urban household.
17Table 2:  Summary of Experiments:  Relative Changes with Respect to  the

































































1)  n.c. - no change
18The second key result  is  that the government was induced to  lower  the
absolute level of rural and urban good prices.  However,  the lower relative
influence of urban households yielded a larger absolute decrease in the
price of the urban good than in the price of the rural good.  Consequently,
while exports and imports declined, a budget surplus was  generated (i.e.,  a
trade surplus)  so that future households obtained an income transfer where
the urban household made a larger contribution to  the transfer than did the
rural household.
Accordingly, employment in the agricultural sector increased, but the
decline  in price and the  increase in labor allocated to production
activities gave rise  to a decline in wages.  The fall in real imports
exceeded the increase  in real agricultrual production, and hence, real
agricultural absorption decreased, causing a decline  in the level of rural
household utility.  Overall, the increase  in If had a deflationary effect on
the current period economy.
3. Increase technical productivity in  the  production of industrial
goods.  In this experiment, productivity of the  industrial good was
increased in a Hicks-neutral manner by one percent.  An increase in
technical  efficiency will  increase the marginal product of labor in the
production of the  this good, which in turn, should increase the opportunity
cost of lobbying, equation 11.  However, the derivative of  (11) with respect
to  an increase  in productivity  (e.g.,  by  increasing the multipicand, say the
parameter An,  in a Cobb-Douglas production function)  is positive in sign if
2
82P /lna  A  is  positive in sign.  Hence,  it  is  possible that an increase  in
technical efficiency will induce the urban household to  increase the amount
of labor  it allocates  to lobbying in spite of the higher opportunity cost.
However, with increased supplies of the industrial good, maintenance of the
previous level of subsidy must occur at a higher government budget outlay
and hence a larger claim on the  incomes of future households.
19These are  the key results  of this experiment.  While the absolute
values of prices increased, the relative price of the industrial good has
fallen.  The decline  in the relative price of the industrial good was akin
to a terms of trade effect;  as  industrial production increased, the
abundance of the industrial  output placed downward pressure on its relative
price.  In the meantime, however, the increasesd technical efficiency also
increased the marginal productivity of labor  in urban lobbying activities
with the end result that the urban household increased the amount of labor
allocated to lobbying.  This  result can also be  interpreted as an attempt on
the part of the urban housheold to countervaeil the tendency of the  terms of
trade to  turn in favor of agriculture.
Further insights  into this result can be seen as  follows.  Clearly,
2 8  Y /aP nA  is  positive.  Hence, increased technical efficiency served to
increase the  "marginal product" of an increase in the output price of the
industrial good.  At the margin, it was therefore  in the household's
interest to  increase its  lobbying efforts  to  seek a marginal  increase  in
their influence on the government's preference weights  (and thus an increase
in P  as compared to the base solution) in spite of the  fact that this
increase occurs at the expense of withdrawing additional labor from
production at marginally increased wages.
The increased lobbying by the urban household induced an increase  in
the price of the urban good.  This increase implies an increase  in the
Government's budget deficit.  Since the influence of the rural household has
declined and the influence of next period households was fixed, the
government chose to  increase the price of the rural good to compensate for
the otherwise larger increase on the claim of next period household income
implied by the increased deficit.  The result was an overall increase  in the
absolute levels of both prices.  However, rural  incomes increased in real
terms because real wages  increased due to  the  increased productivity of
20labor  in industry and also due to  the  increase in the amount of labor
allocated to  lobbying.  This  increase  in income more than compensated for
the increase  in the price of the rural good.  Overall, the effect of
technical change was to make current period households better off and future
households worse off.
A more general implication of this result  is  that in an environment
where households can choose between lobbying  for public investment in
activities which increase productivity or activities wich increase output
price, it seems  likely that the optimal choice may well be to increase
output price.  In this case,  the returns to  lobbying accrue primarily to  the
sector.  Otherwise,  the returns  to lobbying occur outside  the sector,
largely depending on the price and income  elasticity of demand for the
sector's  output.
4. Increased technical productivity in  the  production of  rural goods.
In this  case, Hicks-neutral technical efficiency in the production of  the
rural  good was  increased by one percent.  While the productivity of rural
household lobbying was increased, it was still not rational for  the rural
household to  lobby (i.e.,  the shadow price of lobbying to  the rural
household remained negative but, relative  to  the base solution, smaller in
absolute value).  In terms of  the urban household, an increase  in the
marginal product of rural household lobbying decreases the marginal product
of lobbying by the urban household (equation 7).  Hence, the urban household
decreased its  lobbying effort and, at the margin, saved on its wage and
consumption expenditures.  This  is  the key result of this experiment.
The decreased lobbying by the urban household increased the influence
of  the rural household.  While the technical change effect served to
increased employment and output in the  rural sector, a decline  in the
relative price  (P /P  ) with an increase in labor supply would have deceased
n  a
real wages and, since the  industrial sector  is  a source of wage  income for
21the rural household, rural  incomes would have been adversely affected.
Consequently, with an increase in the relative  influence of the rural
household, the government chose:  (i) to  decrease absolute prices but  (ii)  to
increase relative prices.  The decline in absolute prices decreased the
claim on the  income of next period households, relative to the base
solution.  The production of the urban good declined because Pn/W declined
relative to  the base solution, and hence the urban household was made
marginally worse off.
This experiment reinforces  the notion that rent seeking depends
critically on the possible rewards  available to households  as determined by
the marginal  increase  in its welfare from changes  in the parameters of its
optimization problem, net of the resources the household must expend to
induce  those who can influence these parameters.  The amount of resources
that must be expanded, in the context of this type of a model,  increase as
the welfare of others  included in the government's preference  function
decreases.  For example, the rural household might have been made better off
if opportunities existed for  it  to lobby directly for an increase  in real
wages, although an increase  in wages would have placed downward pressure in
the income of the urban household since, in the context of this model, it is
a deficit supplier of labor  to  the production of urban goods.
In the next comparative static experiment, we  investigate the
consequences of increasing the lobbying efficiency of the rural relative to
the  urban  household.
5.Reduce the  political efficiency of  urban lobbying. As mentioned
above, our choice of the  functional form  (5')  for the  influence functions
implicitly assigns  a larger influence weight to urban lobbying activities as
compared to equal levels of rural  lobbying.  In this experiment, the
"policitcal advantage" of the urban household is  reduced by interchanging
the influence  functions so that the  rural household has the  implicit
22political advantage while the urban household maintains a technological
advantage in the production of the industrial good.
The key result is predicted by equation (7);  the  increase in the
political advantage of the rural household induced  the urban household to
allocate more labor  to  lobbying activities as  though-it sought to
counterveil the tendency of I  to  fall.  Thus more labor was withdrawn from
productive  activities.  However, in equilibrium, the  increased urban
lobbying fell short of compensating for the decline in their  influence In;
and hence  the relative price turned in favor of agriculture as  I  increased. a
Consequently, employment and production in the urban sector declined as
labor was allocated from the technologically more efficient sector to  the
relatively backward rural sector.  The marginal physical product of labor
declined and hence  the real wage rate also declined.
The decline  in imports exceeded the decline  in exports  so that  the
foreign trade performance of the economy improved relative to  the base
solution, column 2, table 1..  This result implies a decline  in the
absorbtion capacity of  the economy and hence, current period household
utility declined.
In general, this experiment highlights the second best nature of the
problem.  Accordingly, in an environment where DUP activities have been
institutionalized, exogenous  interferences or barriers which have the effect
of reducing the  "efficiency" of lobbying may as well result in a further
increase in rent seeking activities  and lead to increased wastage of
resources.  The interesting question then remains:  in such an environment
would an optimal polcy be one of making the rent seeking process as
efficient as possible so that only a small fraction of productive  labor
would be  lost to  such activities?.  In general, what would be the optimal
polciy achived in a political economy in which DUP activities have been
institutionalized?
23V. Other Implications
The essential characteristic of the phenomena of DUP activities
depicted in this  framework is that an environment exists where  it is
rational for individuals  to allocate resources  in search of pecuniary
returns.  The resources so allocated do not produce a good or  service that
enter the utility of others  so that the production possibilities  available
to an economy are reduced.  In the context of the above model,  if the rent
seeking activity of the urban household yields more influence  than the rent
seeking activity of the rural household, then a possible outcome  is  for the
rural household to be taxed (P  <  1),  the urban household to receive a net
a
subsidy (P  >  1) and for the government to  incur a negative  trade balance  (R
<  0) implying claims on the  income of next period households.  In a broder
context, a country may also experience a decline  in foreign exchange
earnings and mounting foreign indebtness.
Depending on the specification of the  influence functions,  the DUP
activities of rural households  can increase the profitability of
countervailing DUP activities  of urban households.  Hence, an environment
that  induces the  seeking of differential advantage  of one group can
indirectly induce DUP activities by another group whose welfare  is  affected
by the activities of the former group  . This behavior may or may not reduce
the  total value of goods  and services produced in the economy11
Countries that pursue inward oriented strategies maintain elaborate
administrative systems  for resource allocation.  These systems, often
10  2
The implication is that  I./alaa  81  >  0.
:1i  a  n
DUP  activities  in these models can be welfare  improving if the
initial point of departure is  from a distorted economy as  in the case of
Krueger's pioneering article.
24characterized by state owned enterprises,  include quantitative restrictions
on imports and exports,  licensing of investment in typically import
substitution activities, controls on foreign investment, and numerous other
instruments  to  influence  incentives  (tariffs, taxes and subsidies).  An
implication of the theory on DUP activities is  that the mere presence of
these elaborate structures can be expected to  generate more resource wastage
than would be expected from an open trade strategy.
To capture  the dynamics of the political economy discussed by Bates and
Olson, the model outlined above will need-considerable respecification along
the  lines of the economic growth models that are common in the  literature.
They can be adapted to  capture  the type of political economy described here.
However, a more complicated task will be to  capture the dynamics  of the
political process.
The above model treats government in a very simplified hierarchial
structure.  To  capture the presence of other political parties, the
polyarchial nature of most government decision making structures,  and the
presence of government enterprises, considerable work obviously remains.  It
appears that  these problems are sufficiently complex that a family of models
might be required, with each focusing a limited dimension of the problem.
25APPENDIX
The  First Order  Conditions  to  The  Government's  Optimization  Problem
+  +*
Given,  Y.  - I.(P.,W)  +  WL  where,  L.  - L.  - 1.,  . is  the  indirect
profit  function  and
ES - (Qn  qna  - qn )  denotes excess  supply.
ED  - (qan  q  - Qa)  denotes  excess  demand.
Assuming  full  employment,  equilibrium  in  the  labor  market  is  given by:
.L.  - Z.L.  - ...  - 0, 1  1  1  1  1  1
Hence, W - W(P ,P ). a  n
Assuming an interior solution, the derivatives of (4)  with respect to the
policy  instruments  P  ,  P  are: a  n
aU/8P  - I  (Va  /ap  +  Va /Y a  (Y a /aP  ))  + a  a  a  a  a  a  a  a
I  (8V  /P a+  8/Vn/aYn(Yn/'Pa ))  +
If( 8Vf/ aYf(R/aPa))  - 0.
aU/an - I  (aV  /ap n  +  Va /BY  (8Y/8P  ))  + n  a  a  n  a  a  n
I  (a V  /BP  +  aV  /BY  (Y  /BPn  ))  + n  n  n  n  n  n  n
If( 8Vf/aY f(R/Pn))  - 0.
For  i,  j  - a,  n,
aY./ap.  - 8a./P j. +  8./aw(8w/a8P)  +  (aW/aPj)Lt,
in which case,  for i - j
Yi./a8P-  Q.-  L.8W/Pi.+(8W/8P.)L  ,  and
8Y./8P. - -L.(aw/ P j  )  +  (aw/aPj)L.
fori  j.
26Let  A.  - 8V./aYi  (i.e.,  the  marginal  utility  of  income).  Multiply  each
1  1  1
i-th  component  of  the  RHS  of  the  above  FOC  conditions  by  (A./A.)  and  define
W.  =  aw/aP..  Then,  the  above  conditions  can  be  stated  as:
1  1
U/8P  - AI(  -q  +  Q  -L  W  +  W L+ )  +
a  a  a  aa  a  a  a  a  a
AI  (  -q  - L  W  +  W+L  )  +
n  n  an  na  an
Aff(aR/PaP)=0.
au/aP  - AI  (-q  -L  W +W L  )  + n  a  a  na  an  na
AI (-q  +  -L  W  +  L)  +
n  n  nn  n L n nn  n
AfI  (8R/8Pa)  - 0.
where:
aR/8Pa-  (q a n +  qaa  Qa ) D/  +  (P-  ED  (1-Pn)8ES/8Pa
and
R/Pn - (Q  - qna  - qnn)  +  (1-P n ) ES/aPn  +  (P a - 1)aED/a P n
Suppose  I  - I  - I  And,  to  simplify  the  problem,  assume  equality  of
a  n  f
the marginal utility of income,  i.e.,  A  - A  - A.  Then it can be shown a  n  f
that  the  prices  chosen  by  government  are  equal  to  world  prices.  The  above
conditions  reduce  to:
aU/Pa - (-q  +  Q  -L  W  +  W L+)  + a  aa  a  aa  aa
(-q  - L  W  +  W  L + )  +
an  na  an
(Qa-  qaa  qan)  +  (1-Pn)ES/Pa +
(P  -)a8ED/8P  - 0. a  a
27aU/aP  n  (-qna-  LaW n  +  WnL )  + n  na  an  na
(-q  +  Qn  - LW  +  W
L+ )  +
Lnn  n  nWL  n  n
(q  +  q  - Q  )  +  (P-l)aED/aP  +
nn  n  n  a  n
(l-P  )8ES/8P =0.
Notice  that  these  conditions  reduce  to:
(a)  (1-Pn)ES/8Pa  +  (P a - l)8ED/8Pa  - 0.
(b)  (P  -l)8ED/aP  +  (1-P n)ES/Pn  - 0. a  n  n  n
Suppose  P  - 1.  Then,  in  the  case  of  (a),  it  is  obvious  that  P  - 1.  The
n  a
same result applies  for  (b).  Since ES  and Ed are homogeneous  of degree zero
in  prices,  it  follows  from  Euler's  theorem  that  P a(ES/3P  )  +  Pn ( 8ES/8 P n )  =
0.  Hence,
(b')  (1-P n)ED/Pa  )  +  (P a -l)ES/aPn  - 0.
and  thus,  P  - 1  and  P  -1. n  a
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